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Abstract Although many governments are assuming the
responsibility of initiating adaptation policy in relation to
climate change, the compatibility of ‘‘governance-for-
adaptation’’ with the current paradigms of public admin-
istration has generally been overlooked. Over the last
several decades, countries around the globe have embraced
variants of the philosophy of administration broadly called
‘‘New Public Management’’ (NPM) in an effort to improve
administrative efﬁciencies and the provision of public
services. Using evidence from a case study of reforms in
the building sector in Norway, and a case study of water
and ﬂood risk management in central Mexico, we analyze
the implications of the adoption of the tenets of NPM for
adaptive capacity. Our cases illustrate that some of the key
attributes associated with governance for adaptation—
namely, technical and ﬁnancial capacities; institutional
memory, learning and knowledge; and participation and
accountability—have been eroded by NPM reforms.
Despite improvements in speciﬁc operational tasks of the
public sector in each case, we show that the success of
NPM reforms presumes the existence of core elements of
governance that have often been found lacking, including
solid institutional frameworks and accountability. Our
analysis illustrates the importance of considering both
longer-term adaptive capacities and short-term efﬁciency
goals in public sector administration reform.
Keywords Adaptive capacity  Climate change
adaptation  Governance  New Public Management 
Public policy  Latin America  Europe
Introduction
Adaptation to climate change is already occurring in both
the private and public spheres as different actors respond
autonomously to the experienced and anticipated threat of
climate change. National governments are expected to take
leadership in the formation of climate change policy and to
provide the institutional arrangements to facilitate auton-
omous action (Eakin and Lemos 2006). These expectations
have increased interest in deﬁning the appropriate forms of
governance for effective adaptation (e.g., see The Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
(BMZ) 2008), and there is a small but emerging academic
literature on the subject (e.g., Eakin and Lemos 2006;
Engle and Lemos 2010). Climate change and resilience
literatures have argued that the success of institutions and
societal organization in building adaptive capacity rests on
such factors as the constraints on actors’ decision-making,
the ﬁt between institutions and ecosystems and appropriate
levels of responsibilities and decision making to facilitate
community adaptation (Adger 2001; Armitage 2005; Folke
and others 2007; Næss and others 2005; Berkes 2007;
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ical observations show that shifts in economic policy, such
as the transition from a centrally planned to a market-
oriented economy in Vietnam (Adger 2000), also have
implications for institutional frameworks and adaptive
capacity.
Nevertheless, there has been relatively little investiga-
tion of how shifts in modes of governance (i.e., ‘‘the set of
regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations
through which political actors inﬂuence environmental
actions and outcomes,’’ Lemos and Agarwal 2006: 298)
may facilitate or inhibit adaptive action. In particular,
public sector policies and structures over the past 20 years
have been globally inﬂuenced by ‘‘New Public Manage-
ment’’ (NPM), a philosophy of administration associated
with neoliberal public sector reforms. While these reforms
have altered the structure and operation of public admin-
istration in both developing and industrial-world contexts,
their implications for adaptation to climate change have not
been explored. Indeed, much of the research on adaptation
governance has been relatively theoretical rather than
empirical in focus (Yohe and Tol 2001; Tompkins and
Adger 2005; Smit and Wandel 2006).
We aim to address this shortcoming by analyzing the
potential tensions between NPM and adaptive-capacity
building. We have looked at ways that NPM has affected
governance and adaptive capacity and the institutional ﬁt
between the objectives of NPM and the requirements for
managing evolving climate-change risks. To illustrate our
argument, we present two case studies of reforms in par-
ticular public sectors and these sectors’ capacity for man-
aging climate variability (as a proxy for the addressing the
day-to-day challenges implicit in climate change): the ﬁrst
looks at Norway’s housing sector and the second the
management of ﬂood risk in Mexico. Although the politi-
cal, economic and geographic contexts of these cases are
fundamentally different, they illustrate certain similar
implications for adaptation to climate change following the
adoption of NPM reforms, providing us with important
lessons about the implications of public administration
ideology for adaptive capacity.
We start with a conceptual discussion of adaptive
capacity and speciﬁc aspects of governance that have been
shown to be important for such capacity. Next, we explore
the literature on NPM reforms and implications for gov-
ernance structures more generally. Third, we draw on both
literatures to describe how NPM reforms may alter gov-
ernance arrangements that affect society’s capacities to
adapt to changing climatic conditions. After presenting the
two case studies, we discuss the similarities and differences
across the two geographic and sector contexts to draw
conclusions on how NPM has enabled or constrained
adaptive capacity.
Adaptive Capacity and Governance for Adaptation
Central to the discussion of governance and climate change
adaptation is the question of whether institutions and
agencies are conducive to the creation, dissemination and
processing of knowledge (learning), and whether decision-
makers have the legitimacy and accountability needed to
take leadership in matters affecting such adaptation (Adger
and others 2005). Lessons from natural-resource manage-
ment, applied to conditions of climate change, illustrate
that ﬂexible institutions that allow decision-makers to
revise and reformulate policy as new information emerges
tend to be more effective in face of uncertainty (Tompkins
and Adger 2005). Institutions inﬂuence the technical and
ﬁnancial capacity of implementing organizations, affecting
their ability to plan and implement adaptation actions (Ivey
and others 2004). Institutional organization may structure
access to power and resources that facilitate or constrain
adaptation for speciﬁc sets of actors, as shown for example
by Eakin (2006). Thus the rules, norms and modes of
decision-making affect how a society organizes its
resources and knowledge to protect itself against harm
from climate change (Nelson and others 2007).
While adaptive capacity or adaptability is not equiva-
lent to the concept of resilience, it is a fundamental
characteristic of a resilient system (Walker and others
2004). Adaptive capacity is the ability of particular actors
(or components of a system) to inﬂuence institutional
structures and the resilience of the system of which they
are a part (Berkes 2007; Walker and others 2004). Recent
work on the linkages between institutions, adaptive
capacity and system resilience has recognized the failures
of top-down, rigid and centralized processes to respond to
environmental change, suggesting that polycentric, mul-
tilevel and participatory governance structures may be
more conducive to building resilience in face of stressors
such as climate change (Ostrom 2001). This research
theorizes that the latter governance structures enable
learning, provide the basis for social memory, increase the
diversity and quality of knowledge available for adapta-
tion, and provide the best basis for trust and collabora-
tion in problem solving (Pahl-Wostl and others 2007;
Plummer and Armitage 2007).
In support of these theoretical insights, Kumler and Le-
mos (2008) found that water-management reforms in the
Paraı ´ba do Sol River Basin in Brazil that created polycentric
and more democratic nodes of decision-making improved
opportunities for learning and resulted in governance that
appeared more responsive and ﬂexible in face of severe
drought. Tompkins (2005) describes inter-agency and
cross-scale planning leadership by the National Hurricane
Committee in the Cayman Islands that proved instrumen-
tal in mobilizing public participation and collaboration in
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the role of citizen participation, decentralized planning and
the inclusion of diverse knowledge sources in mitigating
environmental risks.
Nevertheless, other empirical research has shown that in
practice, decentralizing and democratizing the decision-
making process on key concerns associated with planning
and climate-change adaptation can be problematic (Engle
and Lemos 2010). A case study of coastal management
found that ﬁnancial constraints, access to information,
mandate limitations and the time horizons of public-sector
decision processes affected local capacities to make stra-
tegic decisions about anticipated sea level rise (Few and
others 2007). While public–private partnerships hold con-
siderable promise in mobilizing resources for adaptation
(Adger and others 2005), devolving control over technol-
ogy and knowledge formation to the private sector may not
adequately address the needs of the most vulnerable (Eakin
and Lemos 2006).
Although more research is needed, the evidence sug-
gests that participation in decision-making, access to
knowledge and other resources, and the responsibility of
decision-makers to constituencies are issues of particu-
lar salience to adaptation. Nevertheless, relatively few
empirical studies have questioned how new trends in pub-
lic governance, occurring independently of accumulating
knowledge about adaptation, affect societal adaptive
capacity. To what extent are reforms in public adminis-
tration, completed or underway, compatible with a poly-
centric, multilevel and participatory governance style? In
the current policy environment, responses to climate
change are likely to emerge from experience rather than
theory. It is important, therefore, for close investigations at
a sector or practical level to determine whether shifts in
governance and public administration—reforms in techni-
cal and ﬁnancial capacity; learning, institutional memory
and knowledge; and participation, empowerment and
accountability—are improving or constraining key facets
of adaptive capacity.
New Public Management
New Public Management emerged under the Thatcher and
Reagan Governments in the United Kingdom and United
States respectively as part of a broader neoliberal focus on
policy and public administration taken place all over the
world. Championed in part by World Bank and IMF
structural adjustment programs, NPM-inspired reforms
have since become widespread. Despite national variation
in the scope and depth changes, NPM reforms originate in
similar economic theories and normative values, placing
economic efﬁciency and budgetary control as priorities for
government. The often-stated aims of these reforms are to
enhance the responsiveness of government to citizens, to
stretch the effectiveness of scarce public resources and to
move decision-making closer to the constituents of the
public sector.
Devolution of responsibility and power to lower levels
of government, a core feature in NPM programs. has
involved demarcating commercial from non-commercial
activities of public agencies and encouraging public
agencies to adopt proﬁt-maximising, cost-cutting and
business-development goals similar to those of private
corporations (Painter 2001; Self 2000). In this business-
oriented model of administration, constituents of reformed
public agencies are often referred to as ‘‘customers and
clients,’’ rather than citizens with entitlements (Box 1999;
Christensen and Lægreid 2001).
With this devolution of responsibility the discretionary
power of managers becomes stronger and subordinate
governmental levels and agencies act with more autonomy
through (a) the separation of political and administrative
functions (e.g., ‘‘let politicians set the goals and civil
servants implement them’’), (b) the separation of admin-
istrative functions within the same organisation, or (c) the
transfer of authority from one organisation to another
downward in the hierarchy or to new subordinate govern-
mental organisations (Grønlie and Selle 1998). By trans-
ferring power to managers and splitting agencies into
specialised single-purpose organizations, NPM reforms
aim to streamline functions and reduce redundancy and
waste. For activities considered best implemented directly
by the private sector, outsourcing has emerged as a core
policy goal: speciﬁc services and functions (e.g. mainte-
nance, control, advice) are contracted out to private com-
panies in the belief that specialisation and competition
encourage cost cutting and economic efﬁciency, and thus
enhances the use of public resources.
Achieving greater efﬁciency in public-service provision
and administration has brought about some unintended and
unanticipated consequences, many now well-documented
in the literature. Particularly salient in a discussion of
governance for adaptation to climate change are the
implications of NPM for participatory and democratic
decision-making: whether NPM impedes opportunities for
addressing complex long-term and multisectoral problems;
whether NPM erodes accountability in public agencies; and
whether a government loses moral credibility in social-
environmental interactions because of the high priority
given to economic efﬁciency above all else.
While NPM reformers advocate decentralizing decisions
and reducing bureaucratic obstacles to decision making
(the principle ‘‘let managers manage’’), observers often
ﬁnd a counteracting centralization of power and con-
trol at lower levels of government. This centralization,
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quence of emulating private business practices and incen-
tive structures that emphasize ‘‘making the managers
manage’’ (Christensen and Lægreid 2007, p. 8). True
political decentralisation to democratically elected lower-
level representatives or civil society stakeholders has sel-
dom been a priority weighed against the contrary goal of
increased decision-making efﬁciency. As one critic of
NPM has stated, ‘‘Market-driven managerialism can run
counter to self-governance, as it is structured around the
idea of happy consumers rather than involved citizens’’
(Box 1999, p. 35).
The concurrent concern that the adoption of NPM has
resulted in an erosion of public agencies’ capacities to deal
with complex problems has arisen partly in relation to the
refocusing of public administration on speciﬁc operational
objectives with measurable indicators and tangible out-
comes. The consequence of this refocus has reduced pub-
lic-sector attention on the achievement of complex goals in
favor of greater emphasis on realizing more measurable
one-dimensional outcomes (Dunleavy 1995; Davis 1997;
Weller and others 1997; Painter 2001; Terry 2005).
Further contributing to the ‘hollowing out’ of public
sector policy capacity are such features of NPM public-
sector reforms as privatization, the devolution of functions
and expertise by government departments to alternative
service delivery systems or supra-national institutions, and
limitations on the discretionary roles and functions of
senior public servants (Rhodes 1994). Terry (2005) argues
that NPM has resulted in thinner and more fragile gov-
ernment agencies with reduced regulatory capacities,
diminished abilities to reinforce social norms and values,
and weaker skills in interpreting, adapting to and guiding
social change.
A loss of accountability, particularly affecting the rela-
tionship between the public sector and less vocal citizens,
has also been observed as another unintended effect of
NPM (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). The decline in
accountability appears to be a result of streamlining deci-
sion-making processes, which in turn diminishes the role of
debate and dissent in the policy process (e.g., less learning
by interaction) (Painter 2001). New incentive structures put
in place by private sector agents that take over outsourced
tasks have also had adverse effects on accountability. In
many cases contractual terms are primarily self-serving for
the private actor, thus by-passing and undermining the
NPM motivating principals of greater efﬁciency (Hood
1998; Painter 2001).
Increased vertical and horizontal specialization and
fragmentation associated with NPM reforms have been
linked to disjointed access to resources and services and
an increased potential for conﬂicts among policy objec-
tives and goals. This problem has produced a wave of
post-NPM-reforms, resulting in increased centralization,
new efforts at capacity building and co-ordination (Chris-
tensen and Lægreid 2007). In contrast to the economic
logic, which dominated the initial NPM reforms, these new
reforms apply a more holistic strategy, using insights from
the other social sciences (Bogdanor 2005). This ‘whole
government’ counter-reform process aspires to achieve
horizontal and vertical coordination in order to eliminate
situations in which different policies undermine each other,
make better use of scarce resources, create synergies by
bringing together different stakeholders in a particular
policy area and offer citizens seamless rather than frag-
mented access to services (Pollitt 2003).
It is important to acknowledge that similarities in the
direction and characteristics of administrative reforms
adopted during the 1980s and 1990s deﬁne NPM better
than by any well-deﬁned doctrine or suite of adoption
administrative tools. While generalizations about the
policy reforms associated with NPM are possible, their
adoption always reﬂects local institutional histories,
cultures and policy goals. By bringing existing concerns
and opportunities associated with the implementation of
NPM together with insights on adaptive capacity and
governance emerging in the theoretical literature, we have
identiﬁed several thematic areas in which the aims of NPM
and adaptive capacity-building intersect, to highlight the
difference between the anticipated outcomes of NPM and
expectations for adaptive capacity (Table 1). We selected
these three thematic areas because of their salience in both
the NPM and adaptive-capacity literatures; we do not claim
that Table 1 captures either the characteristics of NPM or
adaptive capacity comprehensively.
In the next section we present two very different case
studies of risk management and adaptation to environ-
mental change in the context of New Public Management.
In each case, we ﬁrst examine the public sector reforms
carried out at the national level and ways in which they
represent a shift away from governance conditions con-
ducive for adaptation. Next we investigate how key facets
of adaptive capacity—of the building sector in Norway and
the water sector in Mexico—have been directly or indi-
rectly affected by NPM reforms. Presenting a case of NPM
reforms from an emerging economy and new democracy
(Mexico) together with a case from a country with a long
history of democratic process and political stability (Nor-
way) highlights the commonalities of intent and structure
that deﬁne NPM reforms in both contexts. Although these
two studies initially were neither designed for comparison
nor shared a common research approach, identiﬁcation of
similarities through comparative analysis of two diverse
geographic contexts is particularly fruitful for eliciting
generalizable lessons rather than case-speciﬁc results. Our
concern is not whether the NPM reforms were effective in
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implementing NPM reforms may have affected adaptive
capacity and vulnerability to present and future environ-
mental change in the speciﬁc geographic contexts in which
the reforms were adopted.
Case 1: Climate Adaptation in the Pre-Fab Housing
Industry of Norway
The initiative to restructure public-sector administration
and management in Norway began in the early 1990s,
emerging from a National Commission report (Ministry of
Consumer Affairs, Administration 1989). The push for
reforms was motivated in part by recognition of the state’s
involvement in the provision of too many goods and ser-
vices, with functions extending from administration and
regulation to direct ownership and operation of traditional
industrial activities. Changes in technology, values, and
ideology, including new attention to tenets of neoliberalism
and individual choice and responsibilities, provided further
motivation. The Commission recommended focusing pol-
icy on issues of strategic signiﬁcance, while decentralizing
the practical implementation of goals and guidelines, under
the slogan ‘better governance at large and less governance
in detail’.
Sectoral reforms followed the Commission report in the
early 1990s, initially incorporating the energy sector and
then expanding to telecommunications and postal services.
A new commission report in 2000 (Ministry of Govern-
ment Administration and Reform 2000) advocated replac-
ing public monopolies with competitive markets and
encouraging public agencies to outsource service and
supply and to stress efﬁciency and quality indicators, and to
consider constituents as ‘‘clients’’ (Ministry of Government
Administration and Reform 2000).
Reforms in the Building Sector
Revised in 1997, the Norwegian Planning and Building Act
(NPBA) sought to clarify liability and responsibility of
different actors in the building sector in order to reduce the
number of building defects originating in planning, design
and construction (Eriksen and others 2009). Before the
reform, municipal authorities responsible for approving
applications for building permits played an active role in
controlling the technical standards of various building
projects. After the reform, responsibility for both building
design and enforcing construction standards clearly fell to
the private sector. Municipal authorities now must ensure
that construction companies have the necessary registra-
tions and control systems in place, but in practice, the
authorities check only that the required paperwork has been
submitted, not that the plans and design for the project nor
that the ﬁnished housing meet the building code’s technical
standards (Nørve 2005; Øyen 2005). Local authorities are
supposed to supervise a sample of approximately 10% of
all building permit applications; however, only a very
small fraction of projects are actually supervised, and the
controls put in place by the companies themselves are often
not satisfactorily implemented (although this issue is now
being addressed in an amendment to the NPBA).
The NPBA-mandated shift in construction planning
responsibilities and functions from the public to private
sectors is particularly relevant for adaptive capacity in a
country of extremely varied, but almost uniformly harsh
climatic conditions. The variability in these conditions and
attendant risks across the country demands a comparable
diversity of locally adapted solutions. While some southern
and coastal areas have a temperate climate (mild winters),
the rest of the country has either polar- or sub-arctic
climate characteristics. Heavy precipitation combined
with strong winds presents a particular challenge to
Table 1 Key areas of potential inﬂuence of NPM reforms on the adaptive capacity of sectors and actors
Potential positive effects on adaptive capacity Potential negative effects on adaptive capacity
Technical and ﬁnancial
capacities
More efﬁcient allocation of resources to where
they are required
A hollowing out of public sector regulatory, technical
and ﬁnancial capacity due to shift in objectives from
professionalism to economic efﬁciency and due to a
devolution of functions and expertise from government
departments to alternative service delivery systems
Learning, knowledge,
institutional memory
Devolution of responsibilities, enhancing the
representation of local knowledge and increasing the
autonomy of subordinate governmental levels in
responding to local needs
Divisions of operational and policy functions in public
agencies, leading to policy fragmentation,
undermining ability to address complex long-term
multisectoral issues, and inhibiting information
exchange and responding to local needs
Participation,
empowerment,
accountability
Enhanced responsiveness of government to citizens as
customers/clients; Decentralized decision making to
where problems are experienced
Loss of accountability, potential centralization of power
within managerial and commercial actors rather than
elected representatives or civil society stakeholders
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123infrastructure and buildings along the western and northern
coast in Norway. Local effects of future global warming
are likely to vary greatly. The average temperature is
projected to rise between 2.5 and 3.5 centigrade, with the
largest temperature changes inland and in the north
(Benestad 2002; Hanssen-Bauer and others 2003; Iversen
and others 2005). Most of the warming is likely to occur
during winter months, while precipitation may increase by
up to 20%, especially in western and northern coastal areas
and during the autumn.
The anticipated climate trends are likely to exacerbate
existing harsh climatic conditions and increase the risk of
such natural disasters as heavy precipitation and wind
events. In addition, freezing, thawing and large snowfalls
are challenges that may intensify with climate change in
southeastern parts of the country. Many defects in resi-
dential housing, such as the penetration of moisture, are
due to exposure to particular climate stresses over time and
are not covered by hazard insurance. While building
standards and quality have generally improved over the last
decade, the costs of correcting faults and repairing defects,
including those from penetration of moisture and rotting,
remain high, amounting to about 13 billion NOK (3 billion
USD) or 10% of annual capital invested in new buildings.
As a result of the NPBA reforms, decisions regarding
building design and structure are not only now relegated to
the private sector (rather than municipalities and local
governments) but also increasingly concentrated within the
private sector with large national or regional companies or
commercial investors, rather than local builders. The new
responsibilities and administrative functions assigned to
private sector actors have required increased administrative
and ﬁnancial capacity. Consequently, small companies are
merging with larger companies or joining national chains
and franchises in order to survive in the construction
industry (Eriksen and others 2009).
For this case, we draw from the ﬁndings of a study that
investigated decision-making, information ﬂow and prac-
tical adaptation actions in the housing sector in Norway,
further described in Eriksen and others (2007, 2009). The
study was carried out as a qualitative case study in the
pre-fab housing industry of Norway, coupled with an
analysis based on a theoretical study of publications
focused on climate change, NPM and building processes
in Norway. The study involved 36 interviews, carried out
in 2005–2007, incorporating public ofﬁcials in municipal
ofﬁces from six municipalities, active in planning and
building services, property administration, urban devel-
opment and environmental administration, and managers
and craftsmen from four different manufacturers of pre-
fabricated housing (for further details, see Eriksen and
others 2007, 2009). The manufacturers and municipalities
were located in different climate zones in Norway
(see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Climatic variations and
study sites, Norway case
(Eriksen and others 2009)
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The transfer of responsibilities to the private sector resulted
in a reduction of technical personnel in local administra-
tions, which in turn contributed to a loss of accumulated
experience and knowledge of building sector needs, vul-
nerabilities, and successful experiences with adaptation.
Their responsibilities were reduced to routine administra-
tive functions, for which paperwork has considerably
increased creating an additional burden on personnel. Local
employees are no longer involved in the learning processes
regarding how to address present and future risks to
housing from climate variability and change.
In contrast, it is not clear whether the private-sector
building companies themselves have lost or gained tech-
nical and ﬁnancial capacities per se through this reform. In
order to meet the new professional and administrative
requirements mandated in the sector reforms, companies
have responded with a higher level of ‘professionalization.’
Some of the larger ﬁrms have strengthened systems of
technical support for projects. However, these capacities do
not necessarily incorporate existing or new local adaptation
knowledge; instead, it appears that expertise regarding
national legal and technical requirements may have been
strengthened at the expense of differentiated knowledge of
speciﬁc local geographic and social conditions.
The merging of small ﬁrms within larger companies has
created a new bias towards centralized building designs
and standards. In the past, both builders and municipal
authorities had expertise in building solutions well-adapted
to local conditions, and their knowledge served to enhance
outcomes synergistically during building projects. This
synergism has largely been lost through the reform, and
local adaptation is now more dependent on the expertise of
the building companies. Although we have limited data on
change in the ﬁnancial capacities of building companies
since the 1997 reforms, there is some initial evidence that
the larger companies with greater ﬁnancial capacity and
presence are now dominating the sector (Eriksen and others
2007, 2009).
Institutional Memory and Knowledge
Prior to the building sector reforms, standards and
approaches to construction design (such as shape of the
roof or the siting of the building in accordance with the
prevailing wind direction) to withstand local climatic
conditions developed into local building styles and tradi-
tions. This accumulated knowledge was institutionalized in
local governments that were responsible for contracting
builders and approving construction projects. Such local
knowledge is critical for adaptation to climate variability
and change because formal regulations alone, even if they
are regionally differentiated, cannot sufﬁciently capture the
local differences and changes in climatic conditions
(Eriksen and others 2009). Formal regulations can never-
theless contribute to retaining local knowledge by making
climate change adaptation and geographically differenti-
ated solutions a focus area and by ensuring that such
considerations are required in any planning. Other focus
areas, such as ﬁre safety and Universal Design (accessi-
bility considerations) have, however, so far taken priority.
In theory, NPM type reforms of the late 1990s should
increase use of local knowledge and provide greater ﬂex-
ibility in standards to suit local conditions through decen-
tralization. In this case, however, the devolution of
decision-making and the centralizing trend within the
building sector have led building companies to become
more dependent on information from sources other than the
municipalities and local authorities. Eriksen and others
(2009) observed large variations in knowledge about
climate adaptation among local builders that are part of
larger companies. Larger ﬁrms may have good access to
new technology and information that can be used to
strengthen local building solutions. An effective learning
process, however, is dependent on a bottom-up information
ﬂow in which local experiences are incorporated into the
company’s development of technical solutions and deci-
sions through routine reporting and feedback. A short
‘‘distance’’ from the local craftsman to the decision-maker
regarding design is critical for creation of locally-adapted
solutions. Where the distance is great, information ﬂow
tends to be top-down, and knowledge of centralised designs
and procedures becomes more important than knowledge
of local climate conditions and building solutions, inhib-
iting adaptive capacity.
Participation, Empowerment and Accountability
The shift in accountability from the municipal adminis-
tration to the manufacturers has ostensibly clariﬁed
responsibilities, but has simultaneously introduced new
problems. Builders are now responsible for monitoring
themselves (‘self-reporting’) and their adherence to codes.
The NPM principle of ‘citizen participation and empow-
erment through the buying powers associated with the role
of a consumer’ now places the burden on the consumer to
demand good climate solutions. Private actors are legally
responsible for building according to existing regulations,
but raising climate considerations with the customer is now
only a matter of ethics. Most citizen-consumers have little
insight into the most appropriate locally-adapted con-
struction solutions and trust the builder to provide any
necessary local adjustments. Individual consumers have
tended to focus instead on aesthetic aspects such as the
decoration of kitchen and bathrooms. Without advocacy by
344 Environmental Management (2011) 47:338–351
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be a higher prioritization of locally adapted climate solu-
tions in building design and construction.
In practice, the NPM reforms have meant that the
market is now indirectly driving building solutions and
design. The emphasis on efﬁciency has led to a focus on
the economics of building manufacture rather than social
and public concerns associated with risk and adaptation to
climate change. The manufacturers’ efforts to reduce pro-
duction time and enhance economies of scale run counter
to such local adaptation efforts as constructing extra wind
barriers where needed. In some cases local carpenters are
making unauthorized and undocumented adaptations to
changing climate conditions that may well lead to better
adapted housing, but which could also produce faults and
defects that may be difﬁcult to identify at a later stage.
Without a transparent and accountable process for
addressing climate risk to housing in particular localities,
local knowledge and experience may be lost, and any local
adjustments are likely to be made in an ad hoc and
unregulated manner, introducing new problems of
accountability should such adjustments fail.
Case 2: New Public Management and Risk
of Flooding in Mexico
The implementation of substantial public sector adminis-
trative reforms, many of which have been associated with
the NPM paradigm, began in the mid-1990s in Mexico’s
Ministry of the Controllership and Administrative Devel-
opment (Cedujo 2008). This period marked a signiﬁcant
change in Mexico’s economic engagement with the world
and a radical change in its domestic political environment.
The Fox Administration (2000–2006) took up the baton of
administrative reform, begun in the previous Zedillo
Administration, calling for a more streamlined, transparent
and efﬁcient public service (Cedujo 2008).
Over the last two decades and in various contexts—
ranging from civil protection to public utilities to poverty
alleviation—diverse administrative and operational func-
tions have been transferred to lower level governments,
state agencies and municipal authorities. Efforts to enhance
transparency and access to information has also become
a priority for Mexican public agencies (Cedujo 2008), and
most government agencies at the state and federal levels
now have elaborate internet sites designed to facilitate the
provision of necessary services and information to citizen-
clients (Klingner 2000). Features of the NPM paradigm
have emerged as key characteristics of the 1990s policies
and reform programs implemented in the water sector, and,
by extension, in ﬂood-risk management.
National Water Policy Reforms and NPM
Until the early 1990s, ﬂood management was primarily the
responsibility of the Secretary of Agriculture and Hydro-
logical Resources (SARH), a highly centralized, techno-
cratic and powerful federal agency. In 1992, a National
Water Law was enacted that clearly reﬂected the admin-
istrative philosophy of NPM. This new law was designed to
improve water access and supply by recuperating more of
the costs of water administration, and, importantly, by
granting concessions for water-supply administration to
municipal governments and quasi-private agencies (Wilder
and Romero Lankao 2006). The law also sought to improve
the participation of local government, water users and the
private sector in the management of water provision and
sanitation, and mandated that states and local governments
take over water infrastructure investments and maintenance
(Comisio ´n Nacional del Agua 2003; Cohen and Gonza ´lez
Reynoso 2005).
At the sub-national level, the state of Mexico
1 created a
State Water Commission (CAEM, or Comisio ´n del Agua
del Estado de Me ´xico) in 1999. Congruent with national
water reforms, state water management policy aimed to be
self-sustaining, using fees to generate ﬁnancial resources,
increase investment in water infrastructure, promote
greater participation of the private sector in the construc-
tion of public works and eliminate the ﬁnancial burden for
water management on the state and municipios (a political
unit roughly equivalent to a U.S. county). Rather than
perform these functions directly, CAEM assists, through
information and technical support, municipal governments
and ‘‘decentralized water management agencies’’ (quasi-
private organizations at the municipio level) in water
management activities.
The ﬁndings of a study of ﬂood management of the
Upper Lerma Valley (see Fig. 2) carried out in 2004 and
2005 illustrates the potential effects of these reforms for
adaptive capacity. The study evaluated the institutional
capacity for ﬂood-risk management in the Upper Lerma
Valley in an effort to illuminate how policy-making, gov-
ernance and disaster response interact to inﬂuence capacity
for adaptation to climate change. The project involved 48
interviews with public ofﬁcials in federal, state and
municipal ofﬁces who were active in water, agriculture,
civil protection, urban development and environmental
administration. (For full details of the approach and
methodology of this study, see Eakin and Appendini 2008,
Eakin and others 2010).
1 The state of Mexico is one of the 31 sub-national administrative
units (states) within the country of the same name.
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The Upper Lerma Valley, just west of Mexico City
incorporates one of Mexico’s most densely populated
regions, the Toluca Valley (del Mazo Gonza ´lez and others
2001). While ﬂooding has always been a concern in the
Valley, the frequency of ﬂood events increased signiﬁ-
cantly after the institutional reforms of the early 1990s.
According to the state’s Civil Protection ofﬁce, over the
period 1994–2005 both the frequency of ﬂood events and
the number of municipios affected doubled in the Upper
Lerma Valley (Fig. 2). The number of media reports of
ﬂood-related disasters in the state also more than doubled
in the same period (DesInventar, www.desinventar.org).
There is some evidence that rainfall has become more
intense in the region (Groisman and others 2005), sug-
gesting that precipitation may contribute to increasing
ﬂood risk in the future. In fact, while most climate-change
scenarios for central Mexico anticipate diminished average
annual rainfall, there are also indications that the hydro-
logical cycle will intensify, resulting in more frequent and
severe extremes events (Instituto Nacional de Ecologı ´a
2009). In face of the prospect of increased ﬂood risk, the
institutional context governing ﬂood management and
planning is likely to play a central role in enabling or
diminishing adaptive capacity, particularly at the level of
municipal authorities who are now in charge of designing
local level interventions to reduce vulnerability from
present, and ideally, future ﬂood events.
According to the new state and federal water laws,
municipalities and quasi-private water service organiza-
tions have now added to their roles in water service pro-
vision and become primarily responsible for managing
ﬂood risk by undertaking such activities as infrastructure
investment, canal dredging and drainage. These agencies
are also responsible for land-use planning, zoning and
control of residential developments. Not surprisingly, these
new responsibilities have been accompanied by technical,
ﬁnancial, and accountability challenges.
Technical and Financial Capacities
To respond effectively to the changing nature of ﬂood risk,
local governments must maintain the hydrological infra-
structure for which they are responsible proactively and
effectively. Following NPM principles, the quasi-private
water operating organizations, now in charge of water
service provision, are intended to be semi-autonomous,
recuperating their operating costs through water user fees,
and investing these funds in infrastructure maintenance.
They also must pay the state for water allocated through the
state water system (which, in turn, has been purchased in
block from the federal government). Interviewees in the
federal National Water Commission (CONAGUA) and
CAEM (the state agency) acknowledged, however, that
very few of the operators have been able to recuperate the
cost of service provision, let alone infrastructure invest-
ment and maintenance. Most are in debt to CAEM, which
Fig. 2 Flooded sites and study
municipios along the Upper
Lerma River, State of Mexico
(Eakin and Appendini 2008)
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increased its debt to CONAGUA.
Even if local administrations had the ﬁnancial capacity
to engage in planning for climate change adaptation, they
would need technical knowledge about hydrological and
climatic trends and scenarios to inform the revision of
technical standards for canal construction, sluices, bridges
and dam operations. At the federal and state level, the
reduction in operational activities of CONAGUA and
CAEM has diminished the capacity for monitoring trends
and changes in water resources just at the time when such
monitoring is becoming increasingly important for climate-
change adaptation. A CONAGUA ofﬁcial estimated that
huan resources in their organization have been diminished
by 80% since the start of the 1990s. Although the resources
of CONAGUA are now intended to be allocated to moni-
toring activities, the interviewees acknowledged that few
ofﬁcials have the time to do more than simply collect,
log and distribute bulletins of data on the country’s
hydrological systems and climate. CONAGUA’s dimin-
ished resources for both scientiﬁc and operational activi-
ties are also reﬂected in the declining investment in its
meteorological stations, eroding the national capacity for
monitoring climate changes. In a region in which land
subsidence is already a substantial problem and past events
are less and less predictive of future hydrological behavior,
inadequate technical knowledge and information exchange
can result in maladaptive investments: infrastructure that
may actually increase risks from future ﬂooding (see Eakin
and Appendini 2008).
Institutional Memory and Knowledge
Effective ﬂood management under climate change requires
knowledge not only about the past and current status of the
socio-ecosystem, but also about ongoing and future chan-
ges of this system over time. While some of this knowledge
is contained in available documents, plans, maps and
information systems, much of it resides in the expertise of
individuals and organizations. One of the expected gains
from decentralization was the ability of governments to tap
into this local knowledge and experience. Yet if local
administrations are constantly changing, leveraging this
knowledge for policy development is difﬁcult. Every three
years the entire staff and leadership in a municipal
administration is likely to change following new elections
and the persistence of practices of patronage and cliente-
lism locally. While CAEM offers speciﬁc training pro-
grams in water management to the private operators who
are increasingly responsible for infrastructure and service
provision in municipios, these operators also rarely last for
more than one municipal administration. Accumulated
knowledge, experience and even basic data and monitoring
information are typically lost in this process.
Participation, Empowerment, and Accountability
According to interviews, the water reforms that were
intended to enhance transparency and participation in
decision-making (through decentralization and cost-recu-
peration), have not signiﬁcantly changed the institutional
culture of water management. In part, the lack of constit-
uent participation in public administration may be due to a
signiﬁcant degree of historical distrust of local authorities.
Interviewees in two rural communities affected by ﬂooding
in 2003 revealed that residents were more likely to rely on
the state government by activating historical channels of
patronage (personal contacts and political links) rather the
municipal authorities who had the ofﬁcial mandate for
action on ﬂood-risk mitigation (e.g., dredging, levee or
bridge maintenance). Following the 2003 ﬂooding, for
example, affected residents who were more politically-
connected submitted hand-written appeals for compensa-
tion directly to the state Secretary of Agriculture. While the
legal responsibility for organizing a public response to
crisis lies with the municipal governments, the threat of
protests by affected communities arrayed outside the door
of the Secretary of Agriculture typically motivated the state
agency to respond rapidly.
While more avenues for participating democratically in
disaster-management activities have been legislated, it
remains the case that the most politically-mobilized ﬂood
‘victims’ are the ones who are able to provoke an opera-
tional response. The continued reliance on extra-legal
avenues to provoke action from the government not only
means that democratic channels are ignored at the local
level, but it also suggests that the ‘‘client-oriented’’ strategy
of the water reform Law is not necessarily streamlining
accountability to the most vulnerable and least-powerful.
The fragmented nature of ﬂood interventions and water
management thus raises important questions about what
agency or group of agencies, and at what administrative
scales, have the mandates, capacities and mechanisms of
accountability to lead the region in enhancing capacity for
adaptation to changing ﬂood risk.
Overall, the general goals of NPM the reforms adopted
in the mid-1990s in the water management sector appear to
be poorly aligned with the institutional needs and capaci-
ties for ﬂood-risk management. The inadequacy of the
NPM-reforms to address the social and ecological com-
plexity of ﬂood risk provides opportunities for the persis-
tence of engrained institutional modes of operation.
Mexico’s institutional culture is still very much intact, and
the ‘‘democratic checks and balances, social controls, and
oversight mechanisms’’ considered necessary for NPM
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p. 403). Other analyses of NPM implementation in Mexico
have noted that expectations of public participation and
client-oriented service provision are impeded by the lack of
civil society organizations and inexperience with the
democratic process (Cabrero-Mendoza 2000). As a result,
local governments may now have more responsibilities, but
in many cases local leadership relies on private-sector
consultants, ofﬁcials at higher levels of administration or
local political bosses (caciques) to compensate for deﬁ-
ciencies in capacity (Cabrero-Mendoza 2000). Neverthe-
less, even if implemented as intended, it is not clear that
NPM would be an effective approach for ﬂood-risk man-
agement. Enhanced public participation and more efﬁcient
local management of resources would still not address the
fundamental mis-match of decentralized ‘‘client-based’’
service provision in the water sector and the coordi-
nated cross-sector, watershed-scale and longer-term vision
necessary for reducing ﬂood risk.
Discussion
The implementation of NPM-type policy reforms in both
Norway and Mexico reveal tradeoffs that militate against
improvement in local adaptive capacity, and, particularly in
the case of Norway, have potentially negative impacts. The
greater efﬁciency of service provision that we describe in
the two case studies—whether the service is economical
housing built to clear regulations and standards, or water
supply and management—were undoubtedly necessary in
both countries. Nevertheless, the changes in policy and
administration have not improved capacities for addressing
the complex, inter-sector and cross-scalar concerns that are
central to climate-change risk. In Norway, NPM may well
have reduced adaptive capacities to respond to climatic
stresses in the housing sector. In Mexico, trends in ﬂood
disasters suggest that the new institutional arrangements
have had no effect in reducing ﬂood risk. In both coun-
tries difﬁcult problems concerning accountability and the
participation of different stakeholders in the adaptation
process have arisen from NPM-type reforms.
Both cases illustrate problems of institutional ﬁt, in
which institutional reforms have restructured control over,
and participation in, risk reduction in ways that do not
match the spatial and temporal scale of the hazard (Folke
and others 2007). Because of the multiple social, ecologi-
cal, political and economic factors that contribute to social
vulnerability in particular places, coordination across
scales and sectors is critical. In the Mexican case, the
combination of decentralization of resource planning to
local governments and quasi-private sector agencies has
reduced interventions in ﬂood-risk management to very
limited, highly local problems: a backed-up drain, or seg-
ment of a river that requires dredging. Broader social and
ecological processes underlying ﬂooding are no longer
central to the mandates of any of the legally responsible
agencies, and there is little evidence that the shift in
responsibilities has resulted in an increase in economic
efﬁciency. In Norway, cutting the cost of housing pro-
duction has taken precedence over enhancing ﬂexibility
and locally-adapted solutions. Public ofﬁcials are now
focused on ﬁling paperwork rather than taking leadership
in adaptation policy. While local responses to climate risk
have been shown to be highly appropriate, the process of
devolution—in principle to local entities— has conversely
centralized standards and housing design in large national
housing and construction companies.
In both contexts, as key regulatory and planning func-
tions have been devolved to lower-scale administrative
agencies and the private sector, decision-making has
become fragmented. Such devolution and decentralization
per se is not necessarily contrary to adaptation. It is gen-
erally agreed that adaptation needs to be enacted at the
scale at which impacts occur, such that speciﬁc populations
react to and anticipate climate-related impacts where they
live and conduct their day-to-day activities (Smit and
Wandel 2006). Flood risk management, however, may well
be an exception to this assumption. Flooding is truly a
system process, involving the interaction of factors at
spatial and administrative scales that are often removed
from the local site of ﬂood damage. Where private eco-
nomic beneﬁts are clear, enhanced private-sector partici-
pation in decision-making and control over technology
development might streamline adaptation processes. In the
cases presented here, however, the policy reforms have not
allowed greater participation of vulnerable stakeholders in
decision-making and, in the case of Norway, may have
actually reduced such participation.
The effect of NPM-type reforms have led to further
concerns about the technical and human resources that are
fundamental for enhancing adaptive capacity. The devo-
lution of responsibilities from public to private sectors in
both case studies reduced technical (and in some cases
ﬁnancial) expertise in the public sector., Although the
reforms have enhanced some formal technical expertise in
the private sector, much informal local knowledge, so
critical for adaptation, has been lost. In the Mexican water
sector, the loss of staff in the state and federal water
commissions has led to a reduction in a capacity for
monitoring and anticipating system-wide changes in water
resources. There is a danger that water management is
being reduced to day-to-day operational activities at the
expense of longer-term anticipatory action. Similarly, in
Norway the loss in technical expertise is evident as
municipal administrations no longer assess the quality of
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building applications. These ﬁndings reinforce concerns
raised by Ivey and others (2004) and Few and others (2007)
that transfers of resources and expertise often do not follow
the shift in responsibilities from the state to local people
and agencies. The hollowing out of existing state capacities
often associated with NPM (Terry 2005) exacerbates the
threat to adaptive capacity.
Further problems arise from the high turnover in per-
sonnel in the public sectors in both countries that under-
mines institutional memory and reduces opportunities for
learning. In both the Mexican water sector and the
Norwegian building sector, the expertise that could be
harnessed for adaptation is not an embedded characteristic
of institutions themselves, but rather of the individuals who
work in them. Thus in Norway, the privatized and cen-
tralized regulation of construction and housing design has
contributed to loss of local knowledge regarding building
solutions that are adapted to particular climate conditions.
The erosion of public-sector expertise has weakened the
exchange of information between municipal administra-
tions and private ﬁrms, an exchange previously critical for
learning how to reduce risk in speciﬁc geographic contexts.
The loss of local knowledge is a particular threat to
adaptive capacity because reliance on formal regulation
alone will not ensure the differentiated adaptation that is
required.
Poor accountability and empowerment remain concerns
in both countries, although, given the distinct institutional
contexts, the problem emerges differently in each case. In
Mexico, the National Water Commission no longer has the
capacity for the research necessary to anticipate climate
impacts on infrastructure, and it is not clear what agency
will be meeting those needs in speciﬁc geographic con-
texts. In the Norwegian housing sector, while the devolu-
tion of functions to the private sector has clariﬁed and
centralized responsibilities, the process appears to have
diffused accountability. Customers do not have the exper-
tise to ensure that housing as delivered is well adapted to
local climate conditions, and municipal authorities are not
responsible for ensuring that the constructed housing is
appropriate. Some of the very local adaptations that do
occur are therefore informal and not subject to monitoring,
and national ﬁrms are unlikely to be responsible for any
problems associated with such adaptations.
One of the premises of NPM is that public services can
be largely driven by citizen ‘‘client’’ demands, but pro-
viding the ‘service’ of proactive climate adaptation, par-
ticularly to vulnerable populations that have little inﬂuence
or command over markets or public policy, is a dubious
proposition. In Mexico, local governments now have more
responsibilities, and as the political process became more
democratic, participation in decision-making was expected
to improve. However, reforms intended to enhance par-
ticipation and transparency have not in practice changed
the existing institutional culture of water management, and
a long-standing distrust in local authorities persists. As
Arellano-Gault (2000, p. 403) writes, NPM ‘‘is being
applied despite a lack of solid institutional frameworks,
rule of law, weak checks and balances, civil service sys-
tems, and effective accountability systems’’ that are con-
sidered prerequisites of NPM in many developed countries.
The result is a continued reliance on extra-legal avenues
which essentially by-pass the local government, and per-
petuate traditions of patronage, clientelism and ad hoc
responses to climate-related disasters. Thus, even when
some populations are able to exert pressure and express
demand for improved services, there is no guarantee that
their interests are representative of a broader vulnerable
public, or that the responses they elicit from the agencies
responsible for service provision will address broader
needs. These observations underscore previous suggestions
that decentralization that does not deal with existing power
structures and institutional weaknesses may reinforce
inequities and fail to address the vulnerability of those most
at risk (Nelson and others 2007; Plummer and Armitage
2007). However, more effective and participatory decision-
making will have little effect over adaptive capacity if the
institutions that govern those decisions are inappropriate to
the temporal scope and scale of the risks they face. In the
Mexican case in particularly, NPM appears to be an
inappropriate model of institutional reform for managing
the nature of ﬂood risk.
Conclusion
Beyond the speciﬁc domain of disaster-risk management,
adaptation to climate extremes is a relatively new subject
for public policy and public administration. As adaptation
to climate change emerges as a concern of government at
different scales, there is a need to evaluate how forms of
governance can inﬂuence adaptive capacity. We do not
argue that the principles of New Public Management are
inherently averse to adaptation to climate change. How-
ever, our case studies do illustrate that philosophies
concerning the organization and structure of public
administration can enable or impede adaptive capacity. As
a result of two decades of evaluations of New Public
Management-inspired policies in diverse geographic and
socio-political contexts, NPM has evolved in ways that
depart from its philosophical origins, and, in some con-
texts, has changed in ways that may actually enhance
adaptive capacities by improving efﬁciencies and basic
service provision. Nevertheless, the case studies described
here indicate that there remain serious issues concerning
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anticipate risk and prepare for climate change, the need to
address local needs and concerns, and concerning govern-
ment accountability to vulnerable populations.
If these problems are to be counteracted, solid institu-
tional frameworks and accountability systems need to be
put in place as part of any governance reform. Climate-
change adaptation must be the explicit responsibility of a
legal entity provided with sufﬁcient ﬁnancial and technical
resources to carry out its responsibilities in practice and to
develop networks for learning and partnerships for deci-
sion-making between fragmented public and private actors.
Within such an institutional system, maintaining people’s
well-being in the face of climate change must constitute a
citizen right rather than a customer ‘‘demand.’’
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